




















Reality and Probability: Introducing a New Type
of Probability Calculus∗
Diederik Aerts
Center Leo Apostel (CLEA) and
Foundations of the Exact Sciences (FUND),




We consider a conception of reality that is the following: An object
is ‘real’ if we know that if we would try to test whether this object is
present, this test would give us the answer ‘yes’ with certainty. The
knowledge about this certainty we gather from our overall experience
with the world. If we consider a conception of reality where probability
plays a fundamental role, which we should do if we want to incorporate
the microworld into our reality, it can be shown that standard prob-
ability theory is not well suited to substitute ‘certainty’ by means of
‘probability equal to 1’. We analyze the different problems that arise
when one tries to push standard probability to deliver a conception of
reality as the one we advocate. The analysis of these problems lead us
to propose a new type of probability theory that is a generalization of
standard probability theory. This new type of probability theory is a
function to the set of all subsets of the interval [0, 1] instead of to the
interval [0, 1] itself, and hence its evaluation happens by means of a
subset instead of a number. This subset corresponds to the different
limits of sequences of relative frequency that can arise when an intrin-
sic lack of knowledge about the context and how it influences the state
of the physical entity under study in the process of experimentation is
taken into account. The new probability theory makes it possible to
define probability on the whole set of experiments within the Geneva-
Brussels approach to quantum mechanics, which was not possible with
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ity calculus”, in Probing the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlocality, Computation
and Axiomatics, eds. D. Aerts, M. Czachor and T. Durt, World Scientific, Singapore
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standard probability theory. We introduce the formal mathematical
structure of a ‘state experiment probability system’, by using this new
type of probability theory, as a general description of a physical entity
by means of its states, experiments and probability. We derive the
state property system as a special case of this structure, when we only
consider the ‘certain’ aspects of the world. The category SEP of state
experiment probability systems and their morphisms is linked with the
category SP of state property systems and their morphisms, that has
been studied in earlier articles in detail.
1 Introducing the Problem
We first introduce the conceptual tools that we consider for our problem.
We suppose that we have at our disposal a physical entity S that can be in
different states p, q, r, . . . ∈ Σ, where Σ is the set of all relevant states of the
entity S. We also have at our disposal different experiments α, β, γ, . . . ∈ Q
that can be performed on the entity S. We suppose that each experiments
has only two possible outcomes, that we label ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Q is the set of
all relevant yes/no-experiments.
1.1 What is Real
Let us consider an example. The physical entity S that we consider is a
piece of wood1. We consider two yes/no-experiments α and β that can be
performed on this piece of wood and that test respectively whether the piece
of wood ‘burns well’ and whether the piece of wood ‘floats on water’. The
experiment α consists, for example, in setting the piece of wood on fire and
observing whether it keeps burning for a sufficiently long time. We give
the outcome ‘yes’ if this is the case, and the outcome ‘no’ if this is not the
case. The experiment β consists of putting the piece of wood in water and
observing whether it floats. We give the outcome ‘yes’ if this is the case and
the outcome ‘no’ if this is not the case2.
We can say that experiment α tests the property of ‘burning well’ of
the piece of wood, let us call this property a, while experiment β tests the
property of ‘floating on water’ of the piece of wood, and we call this property
b.
First of all we have to understand clearly when we say that a piece of
wood ‘has’ a certain property, or, in other words, when a certain property is
1This example was first introduced in [1, 2].
2We remark that are types of wood that do not float on water. For example the African
wood called ‘wenge’.
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‘actual’ for a piece of wood. Let us focus on property a to analyze this. We
say that a piece of wood ‘has’ the property of ‘burning well’ if its state is
such that if we would perform experiment α the outcome ‘yes’ would come
out with certainty. We remark that this is not related to the fact that we
have performed the experiment, because indeed after we have put the piece
of wood on fire, and after it has burned, it will not have the property of
‘burning well’ any longer. The experiment α destroys the property a. This
is common place in the world. However not always an experiment that tests
a property also destroys this property. This is for example not the case for
property b. If the state of the piece of wood was such that we could predict
with certainty that it would float on water in the eventuality of performing
the experiment β, even after having performed experiment β, the state of
the piece of wood will still be such. The important thing to notice however is
that this difference, between the effect of the experiments α and β, the first
destroying the property that it tests, and the second not doing so, does not
play a role in the aspect of the experiments that defines the actuality of the
properties that they test. If we say that a Volvo is a ‘strong’ car, this refers
to experiments that have been carried out in the Volvo factory, consisting of
hitting a brick wall with the car and measuring the amount of damage. A
new Volvo however, the one of which we say that it is a strong car, has not
undergone these experiments, exactly because the experiments will destroy
the car. Still we all believe that this new Volvo ‘has’ the property of being
a strong car. We all demand that the experiment to test the strength has
not been carried out on the car that we buy, and still we believe that this
car, the one that we buy, has this property of strength, because we believe
that in the eventuality of a test, the test will give the ‘yes’ outcome with
certainty.
It is important for the rest of this article to understand this subtle way
of reality. What is real is what we believe to react in a certain way with cer-
tainty to experiments that we eventually could perform, but that in general
we do not perform, because in many cases these experiments destroy what
we were considering to be real. What is real is related to what we eventually
could test, but in general do not test. This is also the way we conceive of
what is real in our everyday world, as the example of the Volvo car makes
clear.
1.2 Attributing Several Properties at Once
When do we say that a piece of wood ‘has’ both the properties a and b?
The subtility of the nature of ‘what is real’ already appears in full splendor
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if we analyze carefully the way in which we attribute several properties at
once to an entity. At first sight one could think that attributing the two
properties a and b to the piece of wood has to do with performing both
experiments at once, or one after the other, or . . . , well at least performing
the two experiments in one way or another. This is wrong. It is in fact
one of the deep mistakes of classical logic, where one introduces indeed the
conjunction of propositions by means of truth tables of both proposition,
as if the truth of the conjunction would be defined by verifying the truth
of both propositions. We have chosen the example of the piece of wood on
purpose such that this mistake becomes obvious. We would indeed be in
great difficulties with our common sense conception of reality if attributing
both properties ‘burning well’ and ‘floating on water’ would have to do with
performing both experiments α and β in one way or another. Putting a
piece of wood on fire and at the same time making it float on water does
indeed not seem to be a very interesting enterprise in collecting knowledge
about the state of the piece of wood. Performing one experiment after the
other, in whatever order, also does not seem to be very fruitful. Indeed, if
we first burn the piece of wood, it does not float on water afterwards, and
if we first make it float in water, it does not burn afterwards. While we
all know that we can have a very simple piece of wood in a state such that
it ‘has’ both properties at once. Most pieces of wood indeed do have both
properties at once most of the time. How do we arrive at this belief in our
daily conception of reality? Let us analyze this matter.
What we do is the following. Suppose that we have a dry piece of light
wood. What we say to ourselves is that whether we would perform ex-
periment α or whether we would perform experiment β, both will give the
outcome ‘yes’ with certainty, and that is the reason that we believe that
this dry piece of light wood has both properties a and b at once. What we
just come to say is clear for everybody I suppose. The question is how to
formalize this. Let us make an attempt. Having available the two experi-
ments α and β we make a new experiment, that we denote α · β, and call
the product of α and β, as follows: The experiment α ·β consists of choosing
one of the experiments α or β, and performing this chosen experiment, and
collecting the outcome, ‘yes’ or ‘no’, and considering this outcome as the
outcome of the experiment α · β. For the piece of wood and the two consid-
ered experiments this product experiment consists of choosing whether we
want to test if the piece of wood burns well ‘or’ whether we want to test
if the piece of wood floats on water, one of the two, and then to perform
this chosen experiment, and collect the outcome. It is clear that α · β will
give with certainty the outcome ‘yes’ if and only if both experiments α ‘and’
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β will give with certainty the outcome ‘yes’. This proves that α · β is an
experiments that tests whether the system ‘has’ both properties a and b at
once.
At first sight strangely enough, our analysis shows that to test the prop-
erty a ‘and’ b we need to use the experiment α ‘or’ β. The logical ‘and’
changes into a logical ‘or’ if we shift from the properties to the experiments
to tests them. That is the reason that it makes sense to attribute a lot of
properties at once, or the conjunction of all these properties, to an entity,
even if these properties cannot be tested at once.
If the reader reflects on how we conceive ordinary reality around us, he
will find that this is exactly what we do. We say that a Volvo is a strong
car ‘and’ is x meters long, for example, because we know that if we would
test one of the two properties, this one would give us an outcome ‘yes’ with
certainty. Although testing the strength of the Volvo, by hitting it against
a wall, would definitely change its length.
1.3 How Infinity Comes In
Remark that the definition that we have given for the product experiment
works for any number of properties. Suppose that we have a set of properties
(ai)i of any size, and for each property an experiment αi to test it, then the
product experiment Πiαi, consisting of choosing one of the experiments αj
and performing it, and collecting the outcome, tests all of the properties ai
at once. The ‘product operation’ does not pose any problems with infinity.
If it is physically relevant to consider an infinite set of properties for an
entity, then the product experiment tests the conjunction of this infinite set
of properties.
1.4 What About Probability?
What we have explained so far is old stuff, and can be found in the ear-
lier articles that have been written on the subject[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. From
here on we want to start to introduce new things, more specifically how
probability should be introduced and understood. We have considered only
situations so far where the state of the entity was such that the considered
experiments would give the outcome ‘yes’ with ‘certainty’, and the concept
‘certainty’ has been used somewhat loosely. Would it be possible to intro-
duce the concept ‘probability’ such that what we have called ‘certainty’ in
the foregoing coincides with the notion of probability equal to 1?
Let us explain first why this is not a trivial matter, and why it even
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seems impossible at first sight. We will see in the following sections that
indeed we have to introduce probability in a completely different manner
than usually is done to be able to see clear in the situation and to solve
the problem. Consider for now that we have introduced probability in the
conventional way.
This means that for a state p of the entity and an experiment α, we con-
sider a number µ(α, p) between 0 and 1, such that µ(α, p) is the probability
that if the entity is in state p the experiment α gives the outcome ‘yes’. This
means that we introduce a function
µ : Σ×Q → [0, 1] (1)
(α, p) 7→ µ(α, p) (2)
where Σ is the set of relevant state of the entity S and Q is the set of relevant
yes/no-experiments. As we said already, µ(α, p) is the probability that the
experiment α gives the outcome ‘yes’ if the entity is in state p.
For standard probability theory µ(α, p) is an element of the unit interval
[0, 1] of the set of real numbers R. If we want to express the situation ‘the
state p of the entity S is such that experiment α would give outcomes ‘yes’
with certainty’, by ‘µ(α, p) = 1’, we have to make certain that our analysis
of the product experiments remains valid.
1.5 Probability of Product Experiments
Let us consider a set of experiments (αi)i, and suppose that for a certain
state p of the entity S, all the probabilities µ(αi, p) are given. Consider now
the product experiment Πiαi. What could be the meaning and definition of
µ(Πiαi, p)? Let us analyze this.
The product experiments Πiαi consists of choosing one of the exper-
iments of the set (αi)i and performing this chosen experiment. We can
express the ‘act of choice’ between the different elements of the set (αi)i by
using the notion of probability itself. Indeed, let us suppose that there is
probability xi that we would choose the experiment αi. This means that our
act of choice is described by a set (xi)i of real numbers, such that xj ∈ [0, 1],
and such that
∑
i xi = 1. With this act of choice, the probability of the






Let us express the situation ‘the state of the entity is such that the product
experiment gives with certainty the outcome yes’ by the formula ‘µ(Πiαi, p) =
1’. The question is now whether this implies that ‘the state of the entity
is such that all of the experiments αi give with certainty the outcome yes’.
This means that from µ(Πiαi, p) = 1 should follow µ(αi, p) = 1 for all i.
This is only true if all of the xi are strictly greater than 0. Let us prove this.
Proposition 1. Consider a product experiment for which the act of choice
is defined by means of a set of real numbers (xi)i ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
i xi = 1,
and hence µ(Πiαi, p) =
∑
i xiµ(αi, p). We have:
{µ(Πiαi, p) = 1⇒ µ(αj , p) = 1 ∀j} ⇔ {0 < xj ∀j} (4)
Proof: Suppose that xj = 0 then
∑
i xiµ(αi, p) =
∑
i 6=j xiµ(αi, p). This
means that
∑
i xiµ(αi, p) = 1 ⇔
∑
i 6=j xiµ(αi, p) = 1. This can however
never imply that µ(αj , p) = 1 ∀j, since µ(αj , p) can be arbitrary without
the sum changing its value. Take now 0 < xj ∀j and suppose that there is a
k such that µ(αk, p) < 1. We have µ(Πiαi, p) =
∑
i xiµ(αi, p) = xkµ(αk, p)+∑
i 6=k xiµ(αi, p). Since µ(αi, p) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i we have
∑





i xi = 1 we have
∑
i 6=k xi = 1 − xk. From this follows that
µ(Πiαi, p) ≤ xkµ(αk, p)+(1−xk) = 1−xk(1−µ(αk)). Because µ(αk, p) < 1
we have 0 < 1 − µ(αk, p), and because 0 < xk also 0 < xk(1 − µ(αk)).
From this follows that 1 − xk(1 − µ(αk)) < 1. So we have proven that
µ(Πiαi, p) < 1.
Suppose that the set of experiments (αi)i that we consider for the product
experiments Πiαi is finite, and that we describe the act of choice corre-
sponding to this product experiment by means of the set of numbers (xi)i,
xj ∈ [0, 1] with
∑
i xi = 1. In this case it would make sense to take out all
the µ(αj , p) for which xj = 0, because anyhow the probability to choose such
a αj during the act of choice is 0, and redefine a new set of experiments (αk)k
for the product experiment that only retain those ones for which 0 < xk.
From proposition 1 follows that for this new set the property that we want
is satisfied: the outcome ‘yes’ is certain for the product experiment if and
only if the outcome ‘yes’ is certain for all the component experiments, where
‘certainty’ is defined as ‘probability equals 1’.
For infinite sets this however does not work in an obvious way. Suppose
for example that we have a set of experiments coordinated by an interval
I of the set of real numbers R. Hence (αi)i∈I is our set. The probability
that one of the αi is chosen will in general be equal to 0 then, because the
requirement
∑
i xi = 1 forces the individual xi’s to be 0. It is common to
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express everything by means of integrals instead of sums in this situation.
For example
∑
i xi = 1 will be replaced by
∫
I
ρ(x)dx = 1, where ρ is a
function from I to [0, 1]. For an interval [j, k] ⊂ I we interpret
∫
[j,k] ρ(x)dx
as the probability that an element αi is chosen with i ∈ [j, k].
There is an aspect that is very uncomfortable from the physical point
of view with this standard description of the infinite case. The probability
to choose ‘one’ of the αi’s equals 0, while in reality it are the αi’s individu-
ally that are performed in the laboratory when real tests are executed. So
although the probability to choose one of the αi’s equals 0, such one of the
αi’s ‘gets’ chosen in reality. This problem is known in standard probability
theory. One usually concludes by stating that probability equals 0 does not
mean impossibility. That is also the reason that in this case probability
equals 1 cannot be interpreted as ‘certainty’.
Because of the fundamental nature of the approach that we are devel-
oping, we cannot be satisfied with this state of affairs. We will show a way
to solve this problem, but it demands the introduction of a new type of
probability theory that is a generalization of standard probability theory.
2 Subset Probability
In this section we introduce a new type of probability description, where a
probability will not be a number of the interval [0, 1], but a subset of this
interval. Let us tell how we arrive at this model.
2.1 Product Experiments and Subsets
We consider again the situation where we have at our disposal a set of
yes/no-experiments (αi)i, and a physical entity S in a state p ∈ Σ. In the
foregoing sections we have described the act of choice by introducing a set
of real numbers xi ∈ [0, 1] with
∑
i xi = 1. Let us reflect a little bit more to
see whether this is a good way to describe the act of choice that we have in
mind when we have introduced the idea of a product experiment.
Such a set of numbers xi means that we consider the situation as if there
is a ‘fixed’ probability for each one of the component experiments αi to be
chosen, and this fixed probability is represented by the number xi. We have
put forward this description because it seems to be the obvious one starting
from standard probability. We can however also look at the situation in a
different way. We can consider the act of choice to be such that we do not
have fixed probabilities for each one of the αi’s, but that we can choose each
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time again in a different way. A description of this idea would be that we
choose each time again among all the possible sets of numbers (xi)i ∈ [0, 1],
with
∑
i xi = 1, and apply then this specific chosen set for a calculation of
the probability of the product experiment. This means of course that the
probability of the product experiment can have different values depending
on the chosen set of numbers (xi)i that describe the act of choice. We can
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider a physical entity S with set of states Σ and set
of yes/no-experiments Q. Suppose that (αi)i is a set of experiments, and
Πiαi the product experiment. If we allow all possible acts of choice described
each time by a set of real numbers (xi)i ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
i xi = 1, then
µ(Πiαi, p) can be any number of the convex hull V ({µ(αi, p)}) of the set
{µ(αi, p)}.
Proof: Consider a particular act of choice represented by the set of numbers
(xi)i ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
i xi = 1. We have µ(Πiαi, p) =
∑
i xiµ(αi, p) ∈
V ({µ(αi, p)}). On the other hand, suppose that x ∈ V ({µ(αi, p)}). This
means that there exists a set of numbers (xi)i ∈ [0, 1] with
∑
i xi = 1 such
that x =
∑
i xiµ(αi, p). This means that if we consider the act of choice
described by (xi)i for Πiαi, then µ(Πiαi, p) = x.
If we consider all possible acts of choice, the convex hull represents the subset
of [0, 1] that described the probability involved. The general situation is how-
ever that we do not have to consider all possible acts of choice. Sometimes
many different possible acts of choice are involved, but we lack knowledge
about which acts of choice realize during an experiments. This situation
can result again in the probability being represented by one number of the
interval [0, 1]. This means that to capture the most general possible situ-
ation we should represent the probability by a subset of the interval [0, 1].
The subset is the convex hull if all possible acts of choice are considered in
an identifiable way, while the subset is a singleton if there is only one act of
choice, or if all possible acts of choice are unidentifiable, which results again
in one act of choice probabilistically distributed over several ‘hidden’ acts of
choice.
2.2 What About Single Experiments
If we let a subset of [0, 1] correspond with the probability for a product
experiment, we seemingly give a special status to the product experiments
as compared to single experiments. If we reflect well however we can see
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that in fact each experiment is a product experiment. Always when we
consider an experiment we choose the location where to do the experiment,
the time when to perform it, and we also choose among the possible setups,
etc . . . . Of course, these choices are made without taking them into account
because they lead to almost identical situations. In principle however there
will be a little subset of the interval [0, 1] centered around one point that in
traditional probability theory is taken to represent the probability.
Let us reflect somewhat about the foundations of probability theory itself
in this respect. A lot of different interpretations for probability have been
proposed. Much of the discussion was between those defending the ‘relative
frequency’ interpretation and those being in favor of the ‘subjective’ inter-
pretation of probability. Our concern here in not about this type of issue.
In fact, the interpretation of probability is rather obvious in our scheme.
If we consider a physical entity S in state p, and an experiment α, then
we consider the probability µ(α, p) to be an element of reality, something
that ‘is’ there, that expresses the tendency of the experiment α to give the
outcome ‘yes’ if α would be performed. We consider this tendency to be
there also when the experiment is not performed, and in fact – think of
our discussion of property – specifically to be there when the experiment
is not performed. When the experiment is performed, and repeated very
often on the entity prepared in an identical state p, the sequence that is
formed by the relative frequency is related to this tendency, in the sense
that it allows us to describe this tendency by means of a number, namely
the limit of the sequence of relative frequency. This is our interpretation of
standard probability. This means that there is no contradiction between the
subjective and relative frequency interpretation within our approach.
As we mentioned already, even for a single experiment we always make a
choice whenever we perform this single experiment. The presence of the fac-
tor choice will make that different sequences of relative frequency, although
they appear from situations that we classify as repeated experiments, will
in general give rise to different limits. These different limits should all be
contained in a ‘good’ description of the probability, certainly if we want
the probability to express the ‘real’ presence of a tendency, because such
a tendency should be independent of the not to control variations on the
context of the experiments. We want the probability to express a tendency
of the physical entity towards contexts of experiments that we classify as
equivalent, although they are perhaps not equivalent if we would be able
to control them better. The situation of the product experiment is in fact
a rough example of this phenomenon that however in principle is always
present.
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2.3 Introducing the Subset Probability
We introduce probability in the following way. Let us consider a physical
entity S in a state p ∈ Σ and a yes/no-experiment α ∈ Q to be performed.
Because of the fluctuations on the context related to the yes/no-experiment
α, the sequence of relative frequency will possibly converge to different limits,
depending on the ‘choices’ that are made between the different possible
hidden contexts.
Definition 1 (Subset Probability). Consider a physical entity S with
set of states Σ and set of yes/no-experiments Q. The probability for α to
give outcome ‘yes’ if the entity S is in state p is a function
µ : Q× Σ → P([0, 1]) (5)
(α, p) 7→ µ(α, p) (6)
where P([0, 1]) is the set of all subsets of [0, 1]. The subset µ(α, p) is the
collection of the limits of relative frequency for outcome ‘yes’ of repeated
application of experiment α on the entity S in state p. When µ(α, p) = ∅
this means that the experiment α cannot be performed on the entity S in
state p. We call µ a ‘subset probability’.
Standard probability theory is retrieved as a special idealized case of our
probability theory if all the subsets that are images of the subset probability
are singletons.
2.4 Inverse Experiments
We have considered always the probability for a yes/no-experiment to give
the outcome ‘yes’. We introduce the probability for outcome ‘no’ by means
of the inverse experiment.
Definition 2 (Inverse Experiment). Consider a physical entity S with
set of states Σ, set of yes/no-experiments Q and subset probability µ. The
inverse experiment α˜ of α ∈ Q is the same experiment where ‘yes’ and ‘no’
are interchanged. We suppose that if α ∈ Q then also α˜ ∈ Q.
To be able to express the relation between µ(α, p) and µ(α˜, p) we introduce
an additional structure on P([0, 1]).
Definition 3. For a subset V ∈ P([0, 1]) we define 1−V = {x |x ∈ [0, 1], 1−
x ∈ V }.
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Proposition 3. For V,W, (Vi)i ∈ V we have:
V ⊂W ⇒ 1− V ⊂ 1−W (7)
1− ∩iVi = ∩i(1− Vi) (8)
1− (1− V ) = V (9)
1− [0, 1] = [0, 1] (10)
1− ∅ = ∅ (11)
Proof: Suppose that V ⊂W , and consider x ∈ 1−V . This means that 1−x ∈
V and hence 1− x ∈W . As a consequence we have x ∈ 1−W . This proves
7. We have ∩iVi ⊂ Vj ∀j. From 7 follows then that 1 − ∩iVi ⊂ 1 − Vj ∀j.
As a consequence we have 1 − ∩iVi ⊂ ∩i(1 − Vi). Consider x ∈ ∩i(1 − Vi).
This means that x ∈ 1−Vj ∀j. Hence 1−x ∈ Vj ∀j. From this follows that
1−x ∈ ∩iVi, and hence x ∈ 1−∩iVi. This shows that ∩i(1−Vi) ⊂ 1−∩iVi.
This proves 8. We have x ∈ V ⇔ 1−x ∈ 1−V ⇔ 1−(1−x) = x ∈ 1−(1−V )).
This proves 9.
Proposition 4. Consider a physical entity S with set of states Σ, set of
yes/no-experiments Q and subset probability µ. For α ∈ Q and p ∈ Σ we
have:
µ(α˜, p) = 1− µ(α, p) (12)
Proof: Consider x ∈ µ(α˜, p). This means that there is a sequence (xi)i of
relative frequency for outcome ‘yes’ of α˜ such that lim xi ∈ µ(α˜, p). From
definition 2 follows that (xi)i is a sequence of relative frequency for outcome
‘no’ for the experiment α. Then (1−xi)i is a sequence of relative frequency
for outcome ‘yes’ for α. If limxi = x then lim(1 − xi) = 1− x. This shows
that 1 − x ∈ µ(α, p), and hence x ∈ 1 − µ(α, p). So we have proven that
µ(α˜, p) ⊂ 1 − µ(α, p). Consider y ∈ 1 − µ(α, p), then 1 − y ∈ µ(α, p). This
means that there is a sequence of relative frequency (xi)i for outcome ‘yes’
for α such that limxi = 1− y ∈ µ(α, p). The sequence of relative frequency
for outcome ‘no’ for α, and hence the sequence of relative frequency for
outcome ‘yes’ for α˜, is then given by (1−xi)i. This means that lim(1−xi) =
1 − (1 − y) = y ∈ µ(α˜, p). So we have proven that 1 − µ(α, p) ⊂ µ(α˜, p).
This proves 12.
2.5 Subset Probability and Product Experiments
In section 2.1 we have analyzed how probability behaves in relation with the
product experiment. In proposition 2 it is shown that µ(Πiαi, p) can be any
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number of the convex hull V ({µ(αi, p)}). This is due to the fact that we
consider all acts of choice to be possible identifiable acts of choice. There is
a subtle matter involved that we will identify first.
Consider again a set of yes/no-experiments (αi)i. If we define Πiαi as the
experiment that consists of choosing one of the αi and then performing this
experiment, we implicitly suppose that we know how to choose consciously
between all of the αi. And if we know how to choose consciously between all
of the αi, it also means that we can identify all of the αi, i.e. we know exactly
which one of the αi is performed. The set of all these possible conscious acts
of choice where each of the αi is individually identifiable leads to the convex
hull V ({µ(αi, p)}, as we have shown in section 2.1. For single experiments
we have remarked in section 2.2 that there is also always a process of choice
involved. It is however always the case that during the actual experimental
process for a single experiment a process of ‘unconscious’ choice takes place.
That is one of the reasons that a single experiment executed repeatedly on
a physical entity in the same state can give rise to different outcomes. We
have proven in other work that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics
can even be fully explained in this way, an approach that we have called the
hidden measurement approach [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
This means that the presence of choice does not necessarily lead to the
probability being defined on a subset rather than on a singleton, as it is
the case for standard probability theory. If the ‘choice’ is randomized again,
because it is an unconscious choice, that cannot be consciously manipulated,
this process of randomization will again lead to a probability defined on a
singleton. The other extreme case is when the process of choice is completely
conscious and can be manipulated at will. In this case the probability will
give rise to a convex set. The general situation is however the one that is
neither a singleton, which is one extreme, nor a convex set, which is the
other extreme.
For the case of the product experiment Πiαi of a set of experiments
(αi)i, we will make the hypothesis that at least each of the experiments
individually can be chosen as a single repeated experiment. This means
that the procedure that gives rise to the sequence of relative frequency for
outcome ‘yes’, the physical entity being in state p, is the following: one of
the experiments αj is chosen, and this experiment αj is repeated to give rise
to a sequence of relative frequency. If this is the procedure that we introduce
for the product experiment, we can show that the probability of the product
experiment equals the set theoretical union of the probabilities of the single
experiments.
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Definition 4 (Product Experiment Procedure). Consider a physical
entity S with set of states Σ, set of yes/no-experiments Q and subset proba-
bility µ. For a set of yes/no-experiments (αi)i ∈ Q we define the procedure
of repeated experiments for Πiαi as follows. One of the experiments αj is
chosen, and this experiment is repeatedly executed on the entity S prepared
in the same state p ∈ Σ to give rise to a sequence of relative frequency
for outcome ‘yes’ of αj . This sequence is one of the sequences to define
µ(Πiαi, p).
Proposition 5. Consider a physical entity S with set of states Σ, set of
yes/no-experiments Q and subset probability µ. For a set of yes/no-experiments
(αi)i ∈ Q, and for p ∈ Σ we have:
µ(Πiαi, p) = ∪iµ(αi, p) (13)
Proof: If we execute the procedure for the product experiment Πiαi as in
definition 4 we find a sequence of relative frequency with a limit that is an
element µ(αj, p) for one of the αj chosen from the set (αi)i. This proves
13.
3 Reality as a Special Case of Probability
After a large detour into mathematical subtleties related to probability the-
ory, we come back now to the origin of our proposal. We want to show
that with the subset probability we can express consistently the concept
of ‘certainty’ as ‘probability equals 1’. Of course, since probability is now
considered to be a subset, the statement ‘probability equals 1’ from stan-
dard probability theory has to be replaced by the statement ‘probability is
a subset of {1}’.
3.1 Certainty for Several Experiments
Let us prove that with the subset probability the certainty for several exper-
iments is expressed well by identifying certainty with probability contained
in the singleton {1}.
Definition 5 (Certainty). Consider an entity S with set of states Σ, set
of yes/no-experiments Q, equipped with a subset probability µ : Q × Σ →
P([0, 1]). For α ∈ Q we say
α gives with certainty yes for S in state p⇔ µ(α, p) ⊂ {1} (14)
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Proposition 6. Consider an entity S with set of states Σ, set of yes/no-
experiments Q, equipped with a subset probability µ : Q×Σ→ P([0, 1]). For
(αi)i ∈ Q and p ∈ Σ we have:
µ(Πiαi) ⊂ {1} ⇔ µ(αi, p) ⊂ {1} ∀i (15)
Proof: From 13 we know that µ(Πiαi, p) = ∪iµ(αi, p). We have ∪iµ(αi, p) ⊂
{1} ⇔ µ(αi, p) ⊂ {1} ∀i.
3.2 Back to the Original Problem
Let us come back to what we discussed in section 1.1. We claimed there
that we believe that a piece of wood has both properties a and b at once, the
property a of ‘burning well’, and the property b of ‘floating on water’. This
is because if we would perform one of the tests of these properties, so trying
out whether it burns well, which we called test α, or trying out whether it
floats, which we called test β, this would in any case deliver us a positive
outcome with certainty. Introducing the subset probability as we have done
in the last few sections makes it possible to replace the concept of certainty
by that of probability contained in the singleton {1}. Following proposition
6 we indeed know that µ(α · β, p) ⊂ {1} ⇔ µ(α, p) ⊂ {1} and µ(β, p) ⊂ {1},
because the subset probability that we have introduced describes well the
idea that certainty is independent of whether we choose to perform α or
β. This is effectively what we have in mind when we introduce certainty
speaking about things that really exist.
At first sight one might think that we have perhaps attempted too strong
to describe certainty by means of probability. Indeed, could it not be claimed
that the standard probabilistic approach has just the advantage of making
the concept of certainty somewhat weaker and replacing it by probability
equals 1, which does not really means certainty, but something like ‘very
very close to certainty’. And is such a concept of ‘very very close to cer-
tainty’ not more realistic than absolute certainty? We totally agree with
this. Often it are cases of ‘very very close’ to certainty that appear in the
world around us. In fact, it is this remark that will make it possible for
us to reveal much more profoundly the motivation of all what we are doing
here. We do not want so much to concentrate on how to describe ‘complete
certainty’, because indeed such ‘complete certainty’ should be a kind of ex-
treme case. More profound to our motivation is that the level of certainty,
whether this level is the extreme case of complete certainty, or whether it is
very very close to certainty, should be in equilibrium, in the sense that this
level should be attained independent of whether we consider one property
15
or whether we consider several properties at once. This is what standard
probability does not accomplish and what we do accomplish by means of our
subset probability. As a bonus it would be nice to have within the mathe-
matical model a way available to express also the ideal situation of complete
certainty. Also in the mathematical model this should be a extreme case.
Also this is not accomplished by standard probability theory and it is by
our subset probability. Let us make this more clear in the next section when
we formally consider situations close to certainty.
3.3 Situations Close to Certainty
Suppose that we consider the situation where we want to express that the
outcomes of an experiment α is very close to certainty. We can do this in an
obvious way by demanding that µ(α, p) ⊂ [1 − ǫ, 1] where ǫ is a small real
number.
Proposition 7. Consider a physical entity S with set of states Σ and set
of yes/no-experiments Q, equipped with a subset probability µ : Q × Σ →
P([0, 1]). For a set of experiments (αi)i and p ∈ Σ we have:
µ(Πiαi, p) ⊂ [1− ǫ, 1]⇔ µ(αi, p) ⊂ [1− ǫ, 1] ∀i (16)
Proof: From 13 we know that µ(Πiαi, p) = ∪iµ(αi, p). We have ∪iµ(αi, p) ⊂
[1− ǫ, 1]⇔ µ(αi, p) ⊂ [1− ǫ, 1] ∀i.
This proposition proves that the level of uncertainty remains the same
whether we consider one of the experiments αj or whether we consider the
product experiment Πiαi. And this should be the case. This is exactly what
expresses what we intuitively have in mind when we think of the procedure
of testing several properties at once. Our level of uncertainty should not
depend on the number of properties tested.
We cannot formulate an equivalent proposition within standard proba-
bility theory, because of the problems that we have mentioned already in
the foregoing sections. Indeed, in standard probability theory we are forced
to define the probability related to Πiαi by means of a convex combination
of the probabilities of the αi, for example expressed by a set of numbers
(xi)i, such that xi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i xi = 1, and the demand that this con-
vex combination probability, expressed by
∑
i xiµ(αi, p), is contained in an
interval [1 − ǫ, 1] does not imply that the single probabilities µ(αj , p) have
to be contained in this same interval. Except when we would demand that
0 < xi ∀i (see proposition 1). But if we demand 0 < xi ∀i we come into
problems with infinite sets of properties and related experiments.
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3.4 Transfer of Other Statements
It is clear from proposition 3.3 that the equivalence between statements
expressed about a collection of properties, or their tests, and the individual
properties, or test, is not limited to statements about closeness to certainty.
The interval [1 − ǫ, 1] in formula 16 can be replaced by an arbitrary subset
of the interval [0, 1], and remains valid.
Proposition 8. Consider a physical entity S with set of states Σ and set
of yes/no-experiments Q, equipped with a subset probability µ : Q × Σ →
P([0, 1]). For a set of experiments (αi)i, p ∈ Σ and A ⊂ [0, 1] we have:
µ(Πiαi, p) ⊂ A⇔ µ(αi, p) ⊂ A ∀i (17)
Proof: From 13 we know that µ(Πiαi, p) = ∪iµ(αi, p). We have ∪iµ(αi, p) ⊂
A⇔ µ(αi, p) ⊂ A ∀i.
So the probability of the product test is contained in an arbitrary subset
of [0, 1] iff the probabilities of all the component tests are contained in this
subset. A special case of this is that the probability of the product test
is a singleton, and hence corresponds to one converging series of relative
frequency, iff the probability of all the component tests equal this same
singleton and hence also correspond to this one convergent series of relative
frequency.
Proposition 9. Consider a physical entity S with set of states Σ and set
of yes/no-experiments Q, equipped with a subset probability µ : Q × Σ →
P([0, 1]). For a set of experiments (αi)i, p ∈ Σ and c ∈ [0, 1] we have:
µ(Πiαi, p) ⊂ {c} ⇔ µ(αi, p) ⊂ {c} ∀i (18)
Proof: From 13 we know that µ(Πiαi, p) = ∪iµ(αi, p). We have ∪iµ(αi, p) ⊂
{c} ⇔ µ(αi, p) ⊂ {c} ∀i.
So we see that by means of the subset probability we can not only express
the idealized situations of complete certainty, as the probability contained
in singleton {1}, but also the idealized situation of a series of relative fre-
quency that converges to one specific limit, as the probability contained in
an arbitrary singleton.
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4 SEP: The Category of State Experiment Prob-
ability Systems
In the foregoing section we have introduced the subset probability for a
physical entity S. In this section we introduce the mathematical struc-
tures involved, independent of whether they are used to describe a physical
entity. The reason to do so, is that in this way these structures can be
studied independent of their physical meaning. They can then be used as a
mathematical model for the description of a physical entity. This section is
self-contained from a mathematical point of view. We introduce specifically
the mathematics that is needed for a mathematical model of the physical
situation that we have considered in the foregoing sections. We introduce
immediately the categorical structure.
4.1 State Experiment Probability Systems
Let us first introduce the mathematical structure of a state experiment prob-
ability system.
Definition 6 (State Experiment Probability System). A state exper-
iment probability system or SEP (Σ, Q,Π, ˜, µ) or shorter (Σ, Q, µ) consists
of two sets Σ and Q and a function
µ : Q× Σ→ P([0, 1]) (19)
On Q there exists a product, that associates with each family (αi)i ∈ Q an
element Πiαi ∈ Q such that for p ∈ Σ
µ(Πiαi, p) = ∪iµ(αi, p) (20)
There also exists an inverse operation on Q, which is a function˜: Q → Q
such that for α, (αi)i ∈ Q and p ∈ Σ we have:
˜˜α = α (21)
Π˜αi = Πiα˜i (22)
µ(α˜, p) = µ˜(α, p) (23)
where µ˜(α, p) = {1 − x |x ∈ µ(α, p)}. There exists a unit element τ ∈ Q
such that for p ∈ Σ:
µ(τ, p) = {1} (24)
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4.2 The Morphisms of State Experiment Probability Sys-
tems
Consider two state experiment probability systems (Σ, Q, µ) and (Σ′, Q′, µ′).
These state experiment probability systems respectively describe entities S
and S′. We will arrive at the notion of a morphism by analyzing the situation
where the entity S is a subentity of the entity S′. In that case, the following
three natural requirements should be satisfied:
i) If the entity S′ is in a state p′ then the state m(p′) of S is determined.
This defines a function m from the set of states of S′ to the set of states of
S;
ii) If we consider an experiment α on the entity S, then to α corresponds
an experiment l(a) on the “bigger” entity S′. This defines a function l from
the set of experiments of S to the set of experiments of S′.
iii) We want α and l(α) to be two descriptions of the ‘same’ experiment of
S, once considered as an entity in itself, once as a subentity of S′. In other
words we want α and l(α) to relate to the states m(p′) and p′ with the same
probabilities. This means that for a state p′ of S′ (and a corresponding state
m(p′) of S) we want the following ‘covariance principle’ to hold:
µ(β,m(p′)) = µ′(l(β), p′) β ∈ P, p′ ∈ Σ′ (25)
Furthermore, since the inverse operation is just a switching of ‘yes’ and ‘no’,
this switching should have the same result whether we consider the descrip-
tion of the experiment, namely α, on the entity S itself, or the description of
the experiment, namely l(α), on the entity as a subentity. This is expressed
by
l˜(α) = l(α˜) (26)
The covariance principle applied for the situation of a set of experiments
(αi)i ∈ Q produces in a similar way the following requirement for the product
operation:
l(Πiαi) = Πil(αi) (27)
We are now ready to present a formal definition of a morphism of state
experiment systems.
Definition 7. Consider two state experiment probability systems (Σ, Q, µ)
and (Σ′, Q′, µ′). We say that
(m, l) : (Σ′, Q′, µ′) −→ (Σ, Q, µ) (28)
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is a ‘morphism’ (of state experiment probability systems) if m is a function:
m : Σ′ → Σ (29)
and l is a function:
l : Q→ Q′ (30)
such that for α, (αi)i ∈ Q and p
′ ∈ Σ′ the following holds:
µ(α,m(p′)) = µ′(l(α), p′) (31)
l(Πiαi) = Πil(αi) (32)
l˜(α) = l(α˜) (33)
We introduce the category with objects state experiment probability struc-
tures and morphisms the ones that we come to introduce and denote this
category SEP.
5 The Categories SEP and SP
We can find back the structure of a state property system that we have
studied in great detail in earlier articles [22, 23, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31] related to a state experiment probability structure, and describing
the properties that are operationally defined by the experiments of the state
experiment probability system. Also the category of state property systems
and its morphism, called SP, appears as a substructure of the category
SEP.
5.1 The Related State Property System
Let us repeat the definition of a state property system.
Definition 8 (State Property System). We say that (Σ, <,L, <,∧,∨, ξ)
is a state property system if Σ, < is a pre-ordered set, L, <,∧,∨ is a complete
lattice, and ξ is a function:
ξ : Σ→ P(L) (34)
such that for p ∈ Σ, I the maximal element of L, and 0 the minimal element
of L, we have:
I ∈ ξ(p) (35)
0 6∈ ξ(p) (36)
ai ∈ ξ(p) ∀i ⇔ ∧iai ∈ ξ(p) (37)
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and for p, q ∈ Σ and a, b ∈ L we have:
p < q ⇔ ξ(q) ⊂ ξ(p) (38)
a < b ⇔ ∀r ∈ Σ : a ∈ ξ(r) then b ∈ ξ(r) (39)
Proposition 10. Consider a state experiment probability system (Σ, Q, µ).
For p, q ∈ Σ and α, β ∈ Q we define:
p < q ⇔ ∀γ ∈ Q : µ(γ, q) ⊂ {1} then µ(γ, p) ⊂ {1} (40)
α < β ⇔ ∀r ∈ Σ : µ(α, r) ⊂ {1} then µ(β, r) ⊂ {1} (41)
α ≈ β ⇔ α < β and β < α (42)
then Σ, < and Q,< are pre-ordered sets, and ≈ is an equivalence relation
on Q.
Proof: Straightforward verification.
Definition 9. Consider a state experiment probability system (Σ, Q, µ). We
define L to be the set of equivalence classes of Q for the equivalence relation
≈ defined in 42, and for a, b ∈ L we define a < b iff α ∈ a and β ∈ b such
that α < β. We denote I ∈ L the equivalence class of τ as defined in 24.
Proposition 11. L of definition 9 is a complete lattice for the partial order
relation <, where the infimum of a set of elements (ai)i ∈ L is given by the
equivalence class of Πiαi, with αj ∈ aj ∀j. We denote this infimum of the
set (ai)i by ∧iai. The minimal element of L is given by 0 = ∧a∈La, I is the
maximal element of L, and the supremum of a set of elements (ai)i is given
by ∨iai = ∧aj<b∀j,b∈Lb.
Proof: Since < is a pre-order relation on Q, we have that < is a partial
order relation on L. Let us prove that ∧iai is an infimum for the set (ai)i.
First we want to show that ∧iai is a lower bound, hence that ∧iai < aj ∀j.
We know that ∧iai is the equivalence class of Πiαi for αj ∈ aj ∀j. Consider
an arbitrary element γ ∈ Q such that γ ∈ ∧iai, and r ∈ Σ such that
µ(γ, r) ⊂ {1}. Since γ ≈ Πiαi and hence γ < Πiαi, from 41 follows that
µ(Πiαi, r) ⊂ {1}. We know that µ(Πiαi, r) = ∪iµ(αi, r), and hence we have
∪iµ(αi, r) ⊂ {1}. From this follows that µ(αj , r) ⊂ {1} ∀j. Using again 41
this shows that γ < αj ∀j. Since γ ∈ ∧iai and αj ∈ aj ∀j we have proven
that ∧iai < aj ∀j. Let us prove now that ∧iai is the greatest lower bound
of the set (ai)i. Consider an arbitrary b ∈ L such that b is a lower bound of
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the set (ai)i. We have to show that b < ∧iai. Take γ ∈ b. Since b is a lower
bound we have γ < αj ∀j. Consider r ∈ Σ such that µ(γ, r) ⊂ {1}. From 41
follows that µ(αj , r) ⊂ {1} ∀j. Then ∪iµ(αi, r) = µ(Πiαi, p) ⊂ {1}. Again
using 41 we have shown that γ < Πiαi. And this proves that b < ∧iai. For
any partially ordered set L where the infimum of any set of elements exists,
the minimal element is given by ∧a∈La. Let us show that I is the maximal
element of L. Consider any a ∈ L, and γ ∈ a. Since µ(τ, p) ⊂ {1} ∀p ∈ Σ
we have γ < τ . This proves that a < I. For any partially ordered set L with
a maximal element and where each set (ai)i has an infimum, each set (ai)i
has also a supremum that is given by ∨iai = ∧aj<b∀j,b∈Lb. This proves that
L is a complete lattice.
Definition 10. Consider a state experiment probability system (Σ, Q, µ)
and the complete lattice L of definition 9. For p ∈ Σ we define:
ξ : Σ → P(L) (43)
p 7→ ξ(p) (44)
where
ξ(p) = {a |a ∈ L, µ(α, p) ⊂ {1}, α ∈ a} (45)
Proposition 12. Consider a state experiment probability system (Σ, Q, µ).
Consider Σ, <, with < defined as in 40, L, <,∧,∨, as in definition 9, and ξ
as in definition 10. Then (Σ, <,L, <,∧,∨, ξ) is a state property system.
Proof: Consider p ∈ Σ, then µ(τ, p) ⊂ {1}. Hence I ∈ ξ(p), which proves
35. Let us consider τ˜ ∈ Q. We have µ(τ˜ , p) ⊂ {0} ∀p ∈ Σ. Let us denote the
equivalence class of τ˜ by a. Then 0 < a. Take an arbitrary element γ ∈ Q
such that γ ∈ 0. The following is satisfied: ∀r ∈ Σ such that µ(τ˜ , r) ⊂ {1}
we have µ(γ, r) ⊂ {1}. This shows that a < 0, and hence a = 0. As a
consequence τ˜ ∈ 0. Since µ(τ˜ , p) ⊂ {0} ∀p ∈ Σ we have 0 6∈ ξ(p) ∀p ∈ Σ,
which proves 36. Consider (ai)i ∈ L and suppose that ∧iai ∈ ξ(p). This
means that for αi ∈ ai we have µ(Πiαi, p) = ∪iµ(αi, p) ⊂ {1}. Hence
µ(αj , p) ⊂ {1} ∀j, which proves that aj ∈ ξ(p) ∀j, which proves one of the
implications of 37. Consider again (ai)i ∈ L such that aj ∈ ξ(p) ∀j. With
αi ∈ ai it follows that µ(αj , p) ⊂ {1} ∀j. Hence ∪iµ(αi, p) = µ(Πiαi, p) ⊂
{1}. This shows that ∧iai ∈ ξ(p) which proves that other implication of
37. Consider p, q ∈ Σ, such that p < q and consider a ∈ ξ(q). This means
that for α ∈ a we have µ(α, q) ⊂ {1}. From 40 and p < q follows that
µ(α, p) ⊂ {1}, and hence a ∈ ξ(p). This shows that ξ(q) ⊂ ξ(p), and so we
have proven one of the implications of 38. Suppose now that ξ(q) ⊂ ξ(p),
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and consider γ ∈ Q such that µ(γ, q) ⊂ {1}. If a is the equivalence class
of γ we have a ∈ ξ(q), but then also a ∈ ξ(p). As a consequence we have
µ(γ, p) ⊂ {1}. Using 40 we have shown that p < q. This proves that other
implication of 38. Consider a, b ∈ L such that a < b, and r ∈ Σ such that
a ∈ ξ(r). Take α ∈ a and β ∈ b. We have µ(α, r) ⊂ {1}, and since a < b
it follows from 41 that µ(β, r) ⊂ {1}. As a consequence we have b ∈ ξ(r).
This proves one of the implications of 39. Suppose that ∀r ∈ Σ we have
that a ∈ ξ(r) implies that b ∈ ξ(r). Take α ∈ a, β ∈ b and consider r ∈ Σ
such that µ(α, r) ⊂ {1}. This means that a ∈ ξ(r), and hence b ∈ ξ(r). As
a consequence we have µ(β, r) ⊂ {1}. So we have shown that α < β and
hence a < b. This proves that other implication of 39.
Definition 11 (Related State Property System). We call (Σ,L, ξ), as
defined in proposition 12, the state property system related to the state ex-
periment probability system (Σ, Q, µ).
5.2 The Related Morphisms
We will prove that a morphism of SEP gives rise to a morphism of SP, the
category of state property systems as defined in [22, 23]. Let us put forward
the definition of a morphism for a state property system as in definition 11
of [23].
Definition 12 (Morphism of State Property Systems). Consider two
state property systems (Σ,L, ξ) and (Σ′,L′, ξ′). We say that
(m,n) : (Σ′,L′, ξ′)→ (Σ,L, ξ) (46)
is a morphism of state property systems, if m is a function:
m : Σ′ → Σ (47)
and n is a function:
n : L → L′ (48)
such that for a ∈ L and p′ ∈ Σ′ the following holds:
a ∈ ξ(m(p′))⇔ n(a) ∈ ξ′(p′) (49)
Proposition 13. Consider two state experiment probability systems (Σ, Q, µ)
and (Σ′, Q′, µ′), and the corresponding state property systems (Σ,L, ξ) and
(Σ′,L′, ξ′). For a morphism (m, l) between (Σ, Q, µ) and (Σ′, Q′, µ′) we keep
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m and define n : L → L′ such that n(a) is the equivalence class in Q′ of
l(α) with α ∈ a. The couple (m,n) is a morphism between the state property
systems (Σ,L, ξ) and (Σ′,L′, ξ′).
Proof: For p′ ∈ Σ′ consider a ∈ ξ(m(p′)) and α ∈ a. This means that
µ(α,m(p′)) ⊂ {1}. Form 31 we have µ(α,m(p′)) = µ′(l(α), p′), and hence
µ′(l(α), p′) ⊂ {1}. This shows that n(a) ∈ ξ′(p′) because it is the equivalence
class of l(α). This proves one of the implications of 49. Suppose that
n(a) ∈ ξ′(p′) for p′ ∈ Σ. This means that the equivalence class of l(α)
for α ∈ a belongs to ξ′(p′). Hence µ′(l(α, p′)) ⊂ {1}. Again using 31 this
implies that µ(α,m(p′)) ⊂ {1}, and hence a ∈ ξ(m(p′)), which proves the
other implication of 49.
Definition 13 (Related Morphism). Let us consider the state property
system (Σ,L, ξ) related to the state experiment probability system (Σ, Q, µ).
We call (m,n), as defined in proposition 13, the morphism of (Σ,L, ξ) related
to the morphism (m, l) of (Σ, Q, µ).
It is easy to see that for any subset A ∈ P([0, 1]) we can link a state prop-
erty system with the state experiment probability system that we consider.
Indeed, for the propositions that we have proved in section 5 and the defi-
nitions that are given there, we can readily replace the singleton {1} by the
subset A of the interval [0, 1], and everything can be proven and defined in
an analogous way. Of course, it is the state property system and the mor-
phisms that we introduced in the foregoing section that describe the state
and properties of the physical entity under study. For a further elaboration
of the structure of the state experiment probability system and its relation
with the different state property systems that we can define in this way, it
would be interesting to study also these other state property systems, and
how they are interrelated. We will leave this however for future research.
We end this article with a last remark. Relative frequencies are ratio-
nal numbers. This means that if we consider limits of sequences of relative
frequency, it does not have to be a priori so that we have to consider these
limits within the completion of R of Q. There is, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no operational reason why the completion R of Q would be superior.
Other completions of Q might be a better choice [32]. There are even op-
erational reasons to believe that other completions of Q might indeed be a
better choice. If we think of the completion used in nonstandard analysis,
where infinitesimals are possible, it would be possible there to explore the
problem that we have considered here. Indeed, it might well be possible that
infinite convex of numbers between 0 and 1 can be introduced there, such
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that all the elements of the convex combination can be taken to be different
from zero while the sum itself remains in the interval [0, 1]. This would be
another possibility to explore that could lead to a solution of the problem of
how to express ‘certainty’ by means of probability. Since the subset prob-
ability works on the level of P([0, 1]) and not on the level of [0, 1] itself, it
might even be that the structure that we have investigated in this article
can more readily be transposed to the situation where another completion
of Q than R is considered.
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